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Electrical reliability assurance is a very important aspect of electrical power systems; significant 
consideration should be given to reliability at both the planning and operation stage of power systems. 
A decrease in reliability levels can lead to enormous economic losses, especially for certain industrial 
facilities, and utilities could be penalized for violation of the mandatory reliability standards. 
Besides the traditional methods for electrical reliability enhancement, it is highly recommended to 
consider the adoption of innovative technologies, such as the integration of Distributed Generation 
(DG) units into the electrical network, especially those which are based on renewable energy source 
(wind and photovoltaic).  
Distributed Generation technologies can be beneficial to the electrical distribution system 
performance. However, these pose certain technical challenges to the reliable operation of the system. 
In this work, we also focus on the micro-grid operation security during islanding mode of operation in 
the presence of DG units. 
In this thesis, the unique aspects of reliability evaluation for an electrical distribution system has 
been performed using system-independent analytical expressions, considering probabilistic load and 
DG unit modeling, under different scenarios including dispatchable and renewable DG units with 
reasonable penetration levels.  
Further, a modified adequacy formulation has been adopted during the islanding mode of 
operation in order to consider micro-grid load correlation and an additional load curtailment level 
introduced in this work. The extra curtailment is needed to ensure adequate technical constraints and 
allow successful micro-grid operation, when the dispatchable DG units rating in a micro-grid is less 
than a defined percentage of the micro-grid peak load at time of islanding. Afterwards, during 
islanding, a second load curtailment level is adopted as needed to ensure service continuity under 
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different operational conditions. A distribution test system is considered, and accordingly reliability 
indices are evaluated for both the worst case load scenario (islanding occurs at peak load), and for a 
realistic case (islanding might occur at any load level). Further, Expected Energy Not Served is 
evaluated.  
In conclusion, the impacts of DG units and islanded operation of micro-grids have been analyzed 
for the enhancement of the overall reliability of the distribution system and the successful islanding 
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1.1 Research Motivation 
Energy is number one concern in most of current elections in North America provinces; therefore, 
major attention to the future energy plan is given. Environmental representatives are supporting 
mainly renewable energy, known as non-dispatchable sources, since they believe that renewable 
energy would bring more job opportunities, and minimise risks on health impacts in the provinces. 
Electrical Reliability analysis has recently been under interest and major consideration for both utility 
industries and customers. It is necessary for the distribution utility to continuously supply the 
electricity with acceptable degree of power quality for customers. 
Electric system reliability implies that all of the power system components should be reliable in 
order to insure a high degree of service continuity of the electrical power supply. Electric reliability is 
comprised of the following concepts ‎[1]: 
 Adequacy: This refers to how much the supply or the generation units are adequate to 
meet the electrical system load demand. In ‎[2], a case study has been developed in order to 
assess the adequacy of generation units responsible for the load demand of a distribution 
system test system. In ‎[3], an evaluation of the system adequacy has been performed when 
distributed generation are connected to the system. In ‎[4], an assessment has been done 
when non-dispatchable renewable DGs (both wind and photovoltaic) are connected to the 
system in both grid-connected and islanding (or micro grid) modes of operation. 
 Operating Reliability: This is related mainly to the power system infrastructure; for an 
accepted operating reliability, it is required that the system withstands disturbances or 
contingencies, and be able to continue operating even if there are problems with the 
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infrastructure or other interconnected systems. In ‎[5] it is shown how an assessment of an  
electrical power system reliability is performed. 
In practical, systems are planned to meet standards for adequacy and also operational reliability. 
Both adequacy and reliability aspects should be considered when balancing the costs of reliability 
efforts and the economic impact of power outages. 
Outages might occur in the generation, transmission, or distribution systems. However, generation 
and transmission systems are much more flexible in dealing with outages than the distribution system, 
so that system operators can compensate for contingencies; unless there are exceptional 
circumstances, consumers will not be aware of the disturbance ‎[1]. Indeed an outage can occur in: 
 generation system: for example if there is a technical problem in a generating unit and it 
must shut down, the system operator can call on reserve margins to meet demand in order 
not to have a loss in the supply.  
 transmission system: for example, if a transmission line trips off, the power can flow 
across different lines so that demand is still satisfied in each area.  
 distribution system: these have less flexibility in dealing with electrical outages. In fact in 
‎[6], it is reported that on average, approximately 75% of all customer number of failure 
and 85-90% of all customer failure durations (hours) were due to distribution system 
problems. The remaining failures were due to loss of supply, experienced in either 
transmission or generation systems. The rationale behind this diminished flexibility in the 
distribution systems is mainly due to lack of redundancy in the infrastructure built into 
them. That is because the cost of duplicating the infrastructure is high, and failures on 




A distribution system would experience an outage related to reasons as follows: 
 lightning; 
 tree contact; 
 loss of supply; 
 adverse weather; 
 scheduled outages; 
 defective equipment; 
 human element (errors in system installation or operation, and deliberate damage). 
An outage or blackout is known as the interruption of electricity for a certain period of time. These 
interruption events are both inconvenient and costly. The effects of outages on different facilities can 
be as follows ‎[1]: 
 At customer level: the inconvenience might be limited to a few moments of darkness, or 
loss of heat that might lead to water pipes damage, depending on the outage extent and 
duration. Loss of air conditioners might lead to heat stroke and loss of refrigeration might 
lead to food spoilage; 
 At public level: traffic light outages might lead to car accidents, with all the economic loss 
for insurance companies, etc... 
 At industrial level: delay in the arrival time of some merchandise due to trucks being stuck 
in traffic may involve losses of millions of dollars for industries and manufactories.  







TABLE I: ELECTRICAL POWER INTERRUPTION COST FOR DIFFERENT CUSTOMER CATEGORIES ‎[7]. 
Customer Segment Average cost for 1 
hour interruption 
Cellular Communication $41,000 
Telephone Ticket Sales $72,000 
Air Reservation System $90,000 
Semiconductor Manufacturer $2,000,000 
Credit Card Operation $2,580,000 
Brokerage Operation $6,480,000 
1.1.1  Reliability in Ontario-Canada 
Before spring 2002, Ontario had a traditional industry structure, where a single vertically 
integrated utility (Ontario Hydro) was dominating the market. At that time, the electricity market in 
Ontario was opened, and the market structure has changed so that Ontario has had an unbundled 
industry structure, characterized by ‎[1]: 
 A clear separation between responsibility for generation and transmission/distribution of 
electrical power. In Ontario, licensed transmission companies are Great Lakes Power, 
Canadian Niagara Power (Fortis), Cat Lake Power and Five Nations Energy, and Hydro 
One, which owns and operates 97% of the Ontario transmission grid, and serves as well as 
the largest distribution company in Ontario. 
 The Independent Electricity Market Operator has become responsible for both the 
operation of the wholesale/operation market, where prices are set by market forces, and 
the operation of the transmission grid. 
 The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) sets regulations for both IMO and all electricity market 




 Allowing generators and bulk power buyers (distribution utilities and large industrial 
customers) to have direct access to the Ontario wholesale electricity market.  
 Allowing retailers to access the customers connected to the distribution system, with the 
possibility of varying terms and conditions of the electricity commodity sales contracts. In 
this way, competition is enabled at the retail level. 
According to ‎[1], electricity represents 18% of the end use energy demand in Ontario, and the 
share of each sector is almost equal. That is to say, that residential, commercial, and industrial user 
each account for one third of the total electricity demand in Ontario. 
Green energy has definitely remarkable environmental benefits, as well as major contribution in 
the electrical reliability enhancement. However the presence of such renewable generation facilities 
introduces different technical challenges in terms of reliability evaluation. Therefore, in this thesis, a 
modified electrical reliability evaluation technique is proposed, in order to consider some challenges 
that hinder electrical reliability enhancement, in presence of DG units, both renewable and 
dispatchable, during islanding mode of operation. Two main criteria are previously set in literature to 
prohibit islanding operation. These criteria are as follows: 
 When dispatchable DG units rating, in an island, is less that a certain percentage of the 
island load level at time of islanding; 
 When power generation level of DG units, during successful islanding operation, is less 
than the island load level at a certain time. 
Further, classical techniques of electrical reliability evaluation, does not provide general 
expressions for electrical reliability parameters, since annual interruption frequency and duration 
expressions depend on the electrical system configuration.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The objective of this work is to perform electrical reliability evaluation for a distribution system 
using system-independent analytical expressions, under various scenarios characterized by different 
dispatchable and renewable Distributed Generation (DG units) penetration levels. Accordingly, 
reliability indices are to be evaluated for both a worst case load scenario (islanding occurs at peak 
load level), and for a realistic case (islanding occurs at any load level). Further, new adequacy 
formulation will be adopted during the islanding mode of operation, in order to take into account load 
correlation and a different load curtailment level. This new curtailment is needed to ensure adequate 
reactive power supply and operational stability for micro-grids, in order to allow successful islanding 
when the dispatchable DG units rating in a micro-grid is less than a certain percentage (defined as 
60%) of the micro-grid peak load at time of islanding. In this way, the probability of a successful 
islanding operation is increased, since an islanding operation could easily fail without the introduction 
of this further load curtailment. A second curtailment could be required during islanding operation 
according to the new (after first curtailment) load and generation level of the considered micro-grid. 
Afterwards, the reliability indices and expected energy not supplied (EENS) for the systems under 
study are evaluated. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
This section aims to provide a brief description of the goal and the content of each chapter in this 
thesis. In Chapter 1 the main reasons for interest in reliability assessment and enhancement are 
discussed, especially with Distributed Generation units installation in electrical distribution systems, 
along with the research objective. Then the research problem literature review is presented in Chapter 
2, for both reliability and adequacy evaluation, with and without the installation of DG units.  
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In Chapter 3 the adopted annual probabilistic models of different micro-grid components are 
presented.  First an annual load model is presented, and then a renewable DG unit output power 
model will be described, followed by a dispatchable DG unit output power model.  
In Chapter 4, a description of the adopted methodology for the evaluation of electrical system 
reliability indices of the adopted distribution test system during different operating scenarios and 
under different fault conditions is given. Further adequacy assessment formulation is presented for 
different DG units categories during islanding mode of operation. Finally, an Expected Energy Not 
Served (EENS) evaluation procedure is described for different operation modes (with and without DG 
units), and based on the first and second curtailment load needed for successful islanding operation. 
In Chapter 5, some assumptions and technical considerations which have been considered for the 
assessment of electrical system reliability indices and for EENS evalation, are presented. Further, a 
description for the adopted electrical distribution test system is provided in this chapter. Last, 
electrical reliability evaluation results are presented and discussed for the different proposed scenarios 
of operation, including different DG units penetration levels, as well as EENS evaluation results, in 
this chapter. 






In this chapter, the relevant importance behind the major interest in different electrical reliability 
analysis and enhancement methods will be described, especially adopting DG technologies at the 
electrical distribution systems level. 
First, general definitions will be presented for electrical reliability from different viewpoints, such 
as the generation and the distribution system perspectives. Afterward, there is a brief discussion of 
different electrical reliability measurements and factors that affect electrical reliability indices 
evaluation. 
Considering Ontario, Canada as a case study, entities that are responsible for electrical reliability 
assurance are then listed. Afterwards different electrical Reliability Enhancement techniques are 
examined, with a more detailed explanation for the Distributed Generation (DG) technology, which is 
considered at present one of the most effective ways for electrical reliability enhancement. Then DG’s 
basic definitions are discusses, including the different technologies used for these generation 
facilities, and factors encouraging the diffusion of Distributed Generation. 
Then polices that are related to Distributed Generation are discussed, both promoting polices (such 
as RPS & FIT) and technical interconnection requirements polices (such as system performance 
requirements, protection devices coordination requirements, et c). 
2.1 Electrical Reliability Measurement 
Reliability indices may be used not only for the characterization of a system as a whole, but may 
also have some of indices an intermediate character. For example, the system considered as an 
independent object might be characterized by an availability coefficient. If a small system is part of a 
more complex structure, it may be more reasonable to characterize it separately with the mean-time-
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to-failure (MTTF) index and the mean-time-to-repair index (MTTR), because they might be used to 
more accurately express the complex system’s availability index ‎[8].  
Some of the more common reliability indices for distribution systems that might help us to 
evaluate the system performance are shown in TABLE II. Further, the same table reports the Canadian 
averages for these indices published by the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) ‎[6]. 
Typical quantitative indices to evaluate distribution systems reliability include System Average 
Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), 
Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), Average Service Availability Index (ASAI), 
Average Service Unavailability Index (ASUI), Energy Not Supplied (ENS), and Average Energy Not 
Supplied (AENS)‎[9].  
All of these indices are obtained from the annual outage rate ( i) and annual outage duration (Ui) 
at each load point (i) of the electrical distribution network. As for SAIFI and SAIDI calculation, the 
corresponding expressions are ‎[5]: 
      
                                      
                                
 
     
   
   
   
   
   
                                         (2.1) 
SAIFI expresses the average number of interruptions of electrical service that a customer would 
experience over the course a year. 
 
      
                                      
                         
 
     
   
   
   
   
                                              (2.2) 
SAIDI expresses the average interruption duration of electrical service that a customer would 




      
                                      
                                      
 
     
   
   
     
   
    
 
     
     
                                 
(2.3) 
CAIDI is considered as the average restoration time of electrical service, and expresses the 
average outage duration that a customer would experience. It is noted that 
    is the number of load points (LPs); 
   is the number of customers connected to the i-th LP; 
   is the annual outage rate of the i-th LP (number of outages/year); 
   is the annual outage duration of the i-th LP (sum of the outages time/year). 
                                                                                                                                (2.4) 
                                                                                                                      (2.5) 
where 
     LP i annual outage rate due to a fault in branch k; 
     LP i annual outage duration due to a fault in branch k. 
TABLE II: RELIABILITY INDICES AVERAGE IN CANADA ‎[6]. 
Measure What it measures Canadian average (2002) 
Index of reliability (IOR)
2 Portion of Time The 
System Is Available  
0.9995 
System average interruption 
frequency index (SAIFI) 
Number of Interruptions 2.4 per year 
System average interruption 
duration index (SAIDI) 
Number of Hours of 
Interruptions 








where IOR= [(8760-SAIDI)/8760]  - the number of hours in a year being 8760. 
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According to the (CEA) report, published in 2002, the Canadian distribution system had an overall 
reliability index (IOR) equal to 0.9995, which means that the system was available for 99.5% of the 
time (excluding the impact of the Québec/Ontario ice storm, which reduced availability to 99.65%). 
2.2 Electrical Reliability Assurance 
Entities that are responsible for electrical reliability assurance in Canada could be summarized in 
the following list ‎[1]: 
 electric industry; 
 provincial governments with their regulators; 
 territorial governments with their regulators; 
 federal government. 
In the following section, each one of these entities will be defined, and the way these entities are 
responsible for reliability assurance will be presented. 
2.2.1 Electric Industry 
In the traditional electricity market, the electric industry was represented in a vertically-integrated 
utility, which was responsible for the reliability assurance; that is to say ensuring power was delivered 
to consumers respecting certain limits and standards. This utility was responsible for generation, 
transmission, and distribution tasks.   
In Figure 1, the different power system components are shown, starting from the generation 





FIGURE 1: ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY ‎[11]. 
During the last decade, and after the opening of the electricity market, many provinces (such as 
Ontario and Alberta) have had a net separation in how the responsibilities of ensuring electrical 
reliability are shared between the generation, transmission, and distribution companies. Since these 
electric industries are responsible for ensuring electrical reliability, they should issue reliability 
standards and policies.  
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), founded in 1968, plays a major role in 
the development of such reliability polices and standards. Moreover, members of this council are 
mostly electric utility and system operators, and most of them have interconnections with other 
regions. NERC assesses and reports on the reliability and adequacy of the North American bulk 
power system, which is divided into eight Regional Areas ‎[11]. 
In Figure 2, the different NERC regions in North America are shown. In TABLE III, North 





FIGURE 2: NERC REGIONS IN NORTH AMERICA ‎[11]. 
TABLE III: NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION REGIONS ‎[11].  
Region Acronym Region Acronym Definition 
FRCC Florida Reliability Coordinating Council 
SERC SERC Reliability Corporation 
MRO Midwest Reliability Organization 
SPP RE Southwest Power Pool Regional Entity 
NPCC Northeast Power Coordinating Council 
TRE Texas Reliability Entity 
RFC Reliability First Corporation 
WECC Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
2.2.2 The Provinces and Territories 
Provinces and territories governments’ and their respective regulator agencies are greatly involved 
in ensuring acceptable levels of electric reliability towards end users. The reason behind this kind of 
involvement is related to the fact that the electric industry in Canada has evolved along provincial 
lines.  
2.2.3 The Federal Government 
Since the electrical network of Canadian provinces are interconnected one to the other, the federal 
government is involved in ensuring electrical reliability by developing general reliability policies, as 
well as other interprovincial and international electrical trade policies. In the federal government 
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system, there are two main organizations that are responsible for the reliability and interconnection 
policies. These departments are: 
 Natural Resources Canada; 
 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
Regarding the international power lines (IPLs) construction and operation, the National Energy 
Board (NEB) inspects the federal regulatory authorization related to these operations. 
2.2.4 Electrical Reliability Enhancement 
Electrical Reliability can be enhanced through the following methods ‎[1]: 
A. Investment: 
Investing generally in infrastructure and in new technologies can improve the electric system 
reliability. Two criteria are set by the system planners in order to identify the appropriate amount of 
investment in reliability: 
 System planners set a criterion of reliability to be achieved, which is to have no more than 
one day of outage every ten years. Then companies compare between different methods to 
achieve the desired level of reliability; among these methods, the lowest cost method will 
be adopted. 
 System planners compare the costs of outage (lower reliability) with the cost of providing 
a greater reliability level. Outage costs include a broad range of economic and social costs. 
Economic costs might include lost industrial production, equipment damage, and spoilage 
of raw materials or food. Social costs might include the inconvenience of lost 
transportation, the loss of leisure time, uncomfortable building temperatures and personal 






FIGURE 3: RELATION BETWEEN INVESTMENT COST AND RELIABILITY LEVEL ‎[12]. 
It is noticed from the previous diagram that a low reliability level corresponds to more frequent 
failures and more outage costs. When investing in infrastructure, the reliability level increases, as do 
the infrastructure costs, but the outage costs would decrease. Moreover, investing in reliability yields 
benefits, but after some point, the benefits are less than the costs. Hence a compromise and an 
equilibrium point should be identified. 
B. Technology 
Adopting new technologies would enhance the electric system reliability. For example the 
adoption of ‎[1]: 
 FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission System) is meant to improve the control and stability 
of the transmission grid, which means increasing the ability to direct power flow and 
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having a very fast response to system conditions in order to enable the transmission 
system to be operated closer to thermal limits, thus improving transmission efficiency;  
 New communications and control tools in order to improve the monitoring of the real-time 
operation of the grid. In this way, the system operator would be able to better understand 
the operating conditions of the system, and be more aware of contingencies in the 
immediate and adjacent control areas. 
 New Dispersed Generation (DG units) technologies, specially the renewable ones installed 
close to load centers. Such a solution would require reverse metering devices in order to 
consider the scenario where these generation units sell power back to the grid in the grid-
connection mode of operation. This solution will be discussed in detail in the following 
section. 
C. Inter-regional trade 
System reliability can be further improved when interconnecting adjacent provinces one to the 
other. This would not only help in enhancing the overall reliability of the system, but also in some 
cases optimizing the construction and utilization of generation resources. Indeed, reserve margin 
requirements tend to be lower in an interconnected environment, since a large pool of generation is 
available to respond to system disturbances. 
Further, interconnecting different regions means different generation facilities, which can be of 
use in exporting and importing electrical power. This is due to the fact that some generation facilities, 
like various hydro power plants, can store water in off peak-periods, and use it to generate and export 
power in peak periods to other connected provinces. On the other hand, sometimes interconnections 
might imply risks, when disturbances might cascade from one region to another, as happened most 
recently in 2003.  
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D. Demand-side management (DSM), and demand response (DR): 
All of the previous methods of electric reliability enhancement are related to the supply generation 
side, but the consumption pattern might have a very significant impact on the system reliability and 
on the supply-demand balance. 
The demand side management (DSM) concentrates on encouraging customers to use more 
efficient equipment and appliances, which consume less electrical power or shift the loads to off-peak 
periods. 
DSM started initially as a non-priced program offered to customers by the utility. Then utilities 
recognized that they might be able to reduce costs if customers are encouraged to apply DSM, hence 
they started funding conservation programs, such as energy audits and providing subsidies for the 
usage of such more efficient equipment and appliances. In some provinces (e.g., British Colombia 
and Manitoba), DSM implies that utilities signal to customers to reduce consumption in times of tight 
supply.  
Another effective practice from the customers side view is the demand response (DR), which took 
place thanks to the competitive power markets. This program mainly consists of providing incentives 
for customers to encourage them to reduce consumption at higher price levels during peak periods or 
when electricity prices reaches a certain level, as is the case in Ontario mechanisms administered by 
the Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO) ‎[13]. 
DS programs benefits mainly larger consumers who have the capability to shift demand to off-
peak periods and who have the necessary metering equipment. The Reliability benefit behind the DR 




FIGURE 4: IMPACT OF PEAK DEMAND REDUCTION ON ELECTRICITY PRICE SAVINGS ‎[14]. 
This figure, valid for a competitive bulk power market, shows the demand vs electricity price; the 
supply cost is represented as a “stepped” curve. By analyzing the previous figure, as customers who 
are able to respond to the DR program decrease their demand, the demand level would decrease from 
d1 to d2, making the price step down from p1 to p2 with cost savings given by the shaded area. It can 
be noticed that a small change in the demand might lead to a remarkable reduction of the electricity 
price. Even for customers who were not able to respond to DR programs, such as residential 
customers, the reduction in the price would benefit them as well. 
E. Integration of Distributed Generation units 
Properly installed and operated, Distributed Generation units (DGs) in the electrical distribution 
system can significantly improve the overall system reliability. DGs installation can benefit both 
customers and the utility. From the customer prospective, an industrial site would benefit from the 
installation of generation units (DGs) by satisfying its base load demand or by having backup 
electrical power in case of interruption or disconnection form the main utility grid. Further, customers 
can benefit from DGs installation by aggregating backup assets for sale to grid. 
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From the other perspective, the utility or energy company could purchase electrical power during 
peak periods in order to meet the power demand of their costumers during peak hours ‎[15]. In doing 
so, the yearly loss of energy would decrease, hence reliability would increase, and utilities would not 
be penalized for not respecting the reliability standards.   
I. DG definition: 
Distributed Generation (DG) is the term used to describe small-scale power generation, usually in 
sizes up to around 50 MW, located on the distribution system close to the point of power 
consumption. Such generators may be owned by a utility or, more likely, by a customer who may use 
all of the power on site or who may sell a portion, or all of it, to the local utility. When there is waste 
heat available from the generator, the customer may be able to use it for applications such as process 
heating, space heating, and air conditioning, thereby increasing the overall efficiency from fuel to 
electricity and useful thermal energy ‎[16]. 
The IEEE has defined Distributed Generation as the generation of electricity by facilities that are 
sufficiently smaller than central generating plants so as to allow interconnection at nearly any point in 
a power system. 
DG is not a new concept, even though some issues still need to be further investigated. It is an 
approach for providing electric power in the heart of the power system. It mainly depends upon the 
installation and operation of a portfolio of small size, compact, and clean electric power generating 
units at or near an electrical load (consumer) ‎[17]. 
Besides the environmental concern, the possibility of supplying electrical power at peaking 
periods, and reducing electricity costs, DG units can significantly contribute to the enhancement of 
power system reliability, as well as power quality levels ‎[18]. 
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Different reports expect that between 2010 and 2020, the number of distributed generation units 
worldwide is going to be doubled. In 2020, 170 TWh of U.S. energy is expected to be produced by 
decentralized power sources ‎[19]. 
There is no generally accepted definition of distributed generation yet. Some countries define DG 
on the basis of the voltage level, whereas others start from the principle that DG is connected to 
circuits from which consumer loads are supplied directly.  Other countries define DG as having some 
basic characteristic (for example, using renewable, cogeneration, being non-dispatched, etc.). This 
section reviews the definitions of DG proposed by different institutes, associations, and scholars in 
regards to the rating of DG power units ‎[19]: 
 The Electric Power Research Institute defines DG as generation “from a few kilowatts up to 
50 MW” ‎[20]; 
 According to the Gas Research Institute, distributed generation is “typically between 25 and 
25 MW” ‎[21]; 
 Preston and Rastler define the size as “ranging from a few kilowatts to over 100 MW” ‎[22]; 
 Cardell defines DG as generation “between 500 kW and 1 MW” ‎[23]; 
 The International Conference on Large High Voltage Electric Systems (CIGRE) defines DG as 
all generation units with a maximum capacity smaller than 50-100 MW that are usually 
connected to the distribution network and that are neither centrally planned nor dispatched 
‎[24]; 
 Chambers ‎[25] also defines distributed generation as relatively small generation units of 30 
MW or less. These units are sited at or near customer sites to meet specific customer needs, to 
support economic operation of the distribution grid, or both; 
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 Dondi et al. ‎[26] defines distributed generation as a small source of electric power generation 
or storage (typically ranging from less than a kW to tens of MW) that is not a part of a large 
central power system and is located close to the load. These authors also include storage 
facilities in the definition of distributed generation, which is not conventional; 
 Ackermann et al. ‎[27]  defines distributed generation in terms of connection and location 
rather than in terms of generation capacity. They define a distributed generation source as an 
electric power generation source connected directly to the distribution network or on the 
customer side of the meter. 
II. Distributed Generation Technologies: 
A critical survey done in ‎[17] aims at proposing new DG types and technologies classification 
according to either the type of fuel used by the DG, or according to the type of technology itself. 
Reporting the different classifications of the DGs and comparing them to each other helps in making 
decisions with regard to which kind is more suitable to be chosen in different situations. 
According to the fuel used, DG can consist of Fossil Fuels Technologies, like Micro Turbines 
(MT) and some types of Fuel Cells (FC), or Non-Fossil Technologies, such as Storage Devices and 
Renewable Generation Systems. From the constructional and technological points of view, different 
kinds of DGs could be classified as noted below. 
Conventional technologies: The traditional choice for on-site generation and remote power 
applications is the diesel generator. Although the name “diesel” is always associated with 
light fuel, these generators can actually be tuned to use a wide variety of liquid and gaseous 
fuels, including natural gas, propane, and residual fuel oil. Advanced diesel engines using 




Advanced fossil technologies (Micro turbine-MT): Over the past decade, two new fossil-
fuel generation technologies have been developed to the point of commercialization or near 
commercialization: the micro-turbine and the fuel cell. Micro turbines are small capacity 
combustion turbines, for example a scaled-down version of the Brayton cycle gas turbine 
used in large-scale central generation. Although primarily designed to use natural gas and 
propane, these systems also can be designed to use a variety of gaseous and liquid fuels as 
fuel oil.  
Renewable technologies: The most renewable technologies used as distributed generation 
units are wind turbines, and photovoltaic. 
III. Factors encouraging DGs Diffusion: 
For many years, power systems were vertically operated. Large power generation plants produced 
all the electrical power. This kind of generation is often related to adequate geographical placement 
(water sources, technical constraints, etc.). The power is then transmitted toward large consumption 
centers over long distances and using different high-voltage transmission levels. This operating 
structure was built on the basis of economy, security, and quality of supply. This very centralized 
structure is operated by hierarchical control centers and allows the system to be monitored and 
controlled continuously. The generation is instantly adjusted to the consumption (by monitoring the 
frequency and on the basis of very elaborate load forecasting models) ‎[28].  
The voltage is also controlled to be within specific limits by means of appropriate coordinated 
devices, generators, online tap changers, reactive compensation devices, etc. This operating mode is 
changing, due to electric utilities as well as to public organizations. There are several reasons for 
these changes, some of which are as follows ‎[29]: 
 Saturation of the existing network and reduction of security margins; 
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 Geographical and ecological constraints; 
 Stability and security problems (need for expensive preventive measures, increase in 
short-circuit currents); 
 Continuous growth of demand, especially in the emerging countries; 
 Need for investment to sustain the development in the power demand. This development 
has led to the breaking up of investments (small generation units, cogeneration); 
 Privatization, deregulation, and competitive markets; 
 Emergence of new, rational, generation techniques with small ratings, ecological benefits, 
increased profitability, and which can be combined with heat generation. 
Due to these reasons, the electric power system planners are oriented to use other alternatives to 
the traditional method of planning. Distributed Generation appeared as one of the most important 
alternatives. The main reasons for the increasingly widespread use of DG can be summarized as 
follows ‎[15]: 
 DG units are closer to customers so that transmission and distribution assets costs are 
avoided or reduced; 
 The latest technology has made available plants with high efficiency and ranging in 
capacity from a few kW to a few tens of MW. 
 It is easier to find sites for small generators; 
 Natural gas, often used as fuel in DG stations, is distributed almost everywhere and stable 
prices are to be expected; 
 Usually DG plants require shorter installation times and the investment risk is not so high; 




 The liberalization of the electricity market contributes to creating opportunities for new 
utilities in the power generation sector; 
 Transmission and distribution costs have risen while DG costs have dropped; as a result 
the avoided costs produced by DG are increasing; 
 DG offers great values as it provides a flexible way to choose a wide range of 
combinations of cost and reliability; 
 Minimize transmission and distribution losses costs; 
 Potentially lower emissions in case of renewable DG units;   
 Improved reliability via disruption prevention; 
 Potential to save energy producers and consumers money, and allows wider user choice; 
 May be developed more quickly than central station generators. 
IV. Polices promoting DGs: 
i) Renewable Portfolio Standard-RPS 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is one of the most popular policy models by witch 
governments fund renewable energy and uses a target or quota for renewable energy that is legislated 
and determined by policy regulations ‎[30]. Other common names for the same concept include 
Renewable Electricity Standard (RES) at the United States federal level and Renewable Obligation in 
the UK. 
RPS accelerates the deployment of renewable energy technologies (such as wind, solar, biomass, 
and geothermal), builds economies at low carbon economy of scale that reduce technology costs, and 
carves out a space for solar within the electricity market‎ ‎[31]. 
Further, in many cases, RPS is based on a system of tradable renewable credits and bidding 
processes for companies, with the value of the credits determined by a wide range of factors. This 
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description has been given by Galiteva, listed in the Alt Car Expo program as an energy expert in a 
talk titled “Strategies for the Successful Integration of Renewable Energy Sources into the Power 
Grid" ‎[30]. 
Additionally, most RPS laws require states or countries to increase the percentage of renewable 
power sources used from the current amount to between 10 and 20% over about 20 years. Increasing 
the required amount of renewable power required over time allows industry to grow into the demand 
and can put the power industry on a path toward increased sustainability.  
In this way RPS laws ensure not only that a minimum amount of renewable energy is included in 
the portfolio of the electricity resources serving a state, but also ensure that states will have a diverse 
energy portfolio to protect us into the future ‎[32]. In Europe, RPS policies are called quota-based 
mechanisms, quota obligations, or renewables obligations, and they require electric utilities to provide 
renewable electricity to their customers, typically as a percentage of total energy use ‎[33]. 
ii) Feed in Tariffs-FIT 
The feed-in tariff program is one of the promoting polices for encouraging customers towards the 
installation of Distributed Generation units, specially the renewable technologies, such as wind and 
solar panels. A general definition of the feed-in tariff is as follows ‎[34]: 
“A feed-in tariff is a pricing mechanism whereby an electricity utility pays a customer for 
electricity that is generated by the customer and exported to the grid. 
The objectives behind having a feed-in tariff can include: 
 encouraging local, distributed generation, thereby reducing load on the network and 
reducing distribution losses associated with the transmission of electricity from centralised 
generators through the distribution network to customers; 
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 encouraging uptake of, and stimulating innovation in, renewable energy technology (either 
generally, or a specific type of technology) and reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 
lessening reliance on non-renewable energy sources. 
Generally, feed-in tariffs are based on a premium price being paid to the customer that is in excess 
of the normal wholesale cost of generation, and sometimes in excess of the normal retail price of 
electricity. Feed-in tariffs are generally available to residential customers, or to those customers 
below a given consumption threshold, and are not likely to be available to commercial scale 
electricity generation”. 
V. Policies for sucsessful integration of DG units. 
The interconnection of DG units with electric power systems is most often regulated by national 
and international standards (such as the IEEE 1547), which do not permit islanded operation of parts 
of a public feeder. This means that following a fault or an outage in the electric system, the DG has to 
disconnect and remain disconnected until the fault is cleared.  
Recently in Europe, and for example in Italy, Norm CEI 0-16  which does not exclude the possibility 
of islanding operation for a portion of a Medium Voltage (MV) public distribution system has been 
issued. According to this Italian norm, islanding operation is temporarily allowed (e.g., for 
maintenance purposes), provided that specific agreements between the distribution operator and the 
active (generators owners) and passive (e.g., very relevant loads) customers connected to the 
considered MV network are made.       
Interconnection of the DG units must comply with relevant Ontario and Canadian regulations and 
international design standards. In the following list, the main technical requirements for a successful 




i) Technical Interconnection Requirements: 
(a) General requirements: 
The connection to the ground of DG units should not make the voltage level exceed the rating of 
equipment connected to Hydro One’s distribution system. The transformer responsible for the 
interfacing of DG units with the grid should not disrupt the coordination of the protection related to 
ground faults of Hydro One’s distribution system. The installation of DG units should not make the 
fault levels exceed the limits set by the transmission system code (TSC). DG units should be 
protected by proper insulation coordination against lightning and transient over-voltage. 
(b)  Performance requirements 
Regarding the reliability issue, the installation of DG units should not compromise or restrict the 
existing reliability and operation level of the distribution system. The interconnection of a DG unit 
should not make the power quality performance go below the accepted levels. DG units should be 
equipped with devices that can measure, record and report the overall performance, and demonstrate 
observance of the necessary technical requirements. This should be assured by the DG unit owner. In 
case the interconnection of DG units deteriorates the performance of Hydro One’s distribution 
system, the DG might be disconnected until negative impacts are alleviated, according to received 
and reported measures. 
(c)  Protection requirements  
Hydro One is responsible for reviewing the protection schemes designs and protection devices 
settings related to the DG units. Since system configuration might change over time, DGs protection 
devices settings must be adequate to the system change. A very important aspect that should be 
observed is that after a fault or outage occurrence, DGs protection devices must assure the isolation 
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from the Hydro One distribution system within the required time. A communication facility between 
protection device (e.g., recloser), transformation station, and the DG unit itself might be required.   
2.3 Reliability assessment in presence of DG units 
Reliability indicates the ability of an electrical system to respond to unexpected contingencies, 
therefore, reliability of distribution systems has become a very important issue, not only from a 
technical viewpoint, but also from an economical one, for both users and network operators.  
As for Systems Reliability Evaluation, in ‎[36] and ‎[37], annual interruption frequency and 
duration at load points (LPs) of a network where islanded operation of DG units is allowed are 
explained by means of practical examples only, derived from specific networks, without providing 
system independent general expressions that can be applied at any electrical network configuration. 
The work in ‎[38] proposed a systematic approach for reliability assessment with general analytical 
expressions. Such expressions have been provided for the calculation of annual interruption frequency 
and duration for LPs of traditional networks, without considering the presence of DG units. Then in 
‎[39], these expressions have been provided considering the presence of dispatchable DG units only, 
and not the renewable ones. Later on, ‎[40] proposed more detailed systematic analytical expressions 
for a distribution network where  islanded operation of microgrids is allowed with both renewable and 
dispatchable DG units; nevertheless, correlation among different loads and protection devices’ failure 
have been neglected.  
The capability of a generation system to make available an adequate and qualitatively acceptable 
supply of electrical energy is measured by the generation system adequacy. Since in the present work 
the islanding mode of operation is assumed to be allowed, islands adequacy assessment is of concern, 
as well as islanding success and failure conditions.  
In order to perform micro-grid adequacy assessment, during islanding mode of operation, an 
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appropriate modeling for both dispatchable and non-dispatchable DG units is required. Dispatchable 
DG units are modeled based on their forced outage rate due to both maintenance and hardware failure 
as explained in ‎[41]. On the other hand, renewable DG units output power are much more difficult to 
be modeled due to the uncertainty associated with their primary source. 
In ‎[42] and ‎[43], renewable energy sources are modeled by means of an analytical approach, 
considering the correlation between such renewable sources and the load. In ‎[44], wind turbine 
generators are modeled as a multi-state unit utilizing an analytical approach. The work in ‎[45] 
presents a probabilistic approach to capture the uncertainty associated with the renewable generation 
primary sources. In ‎[46] two probabilistic techniques are proposed to model the wind generation 
system. In ‎[47], a wind farm generation system is modeled utilizing a general probabilistic approach. 
Then ‎[48] proposed a probabilistic model for a hybrid renewable generation units composed of wind 
and photovoltaic (PV) systems. In ‎[49] and ‎[50], Monte-Carlo Simulation technique (MCS) is 
presented to model wind output power. In ‎[51], wind farm performance is assessed utilizing Monte 
Carlo simulation (MCS) during grid-connected mode of operation. In ‎[53] is presented a probabilistic 
model for wind based DG unit output power through the estimation of the wind speed profile, 
utilizing a novel constrained Grey predictor technique. 
As for DG units Adequacy Assessment in a micro-grid, during an islanding mode of operation, ‎[4] 
considered that any deficit in generation during islanding mode will result in islanding failure, 
without considering either load shedding, or load curtailment. In ‎[41], only user load disconnection, 
known as load shedding, has been considered. Then in ‎[40], both load shedding and load reduction, 
known as load curtailment, have been taken into account for the adequacy assessment during 
islanding mode of operation. However, this previous work did not ensure adequate reactive power 




In the previous works, it is obvious that sufficient work has been done to assess both adequacy and 
reliability with renewable DG units during different modes of operation. However, new generalized 
systematic approach for electrical reliability evaluation, especially considering load correlation did 
not receive full attention. Further, islanding success condition enhancement by adopting different 






Annual Probabilistic Models 
In this chapter the adopted annual probabilistic models of different micro-grid components will be 
presented.  First the annual load model is presented, then the renewable DG unit output power model 
will be described, followed by the dispatchable DG unit output power model. Annual load model has 
taken into consideration the variability of load demand during a year based on previous historical 
data. On the other hand, DG units’ annual models considered units’ hardware failure, along with the 
uncertain nature of the primary source in the case of renewable DG units. 
3.1 Annual load modeling 
Since LPs’ power demand level varies during a year, and does not assume always the peak value, 
annual load modeling is required. An annual model presents different load demand levels associated 
with their probability of occurrence during a year. Load levels are assumed to be constant during a 
given time, and change discretely for every time segment (one hour). TABLE IV shows an annual load 
model with ten levels of power; first column contains levels number, second column shows power 
demand load levels in percentage of peak load, and last column shows the probability related to each 










TABLE IV: ANNUAL LOAD MODEL‎[53]. 
Level Power demand 
(%) 
    
  
1 100 0.01 
2 85.30 0.056 
3 77.40 0.1057 
4 71.30 0.1654 
5 65 0.1654 
6 58.50 0.163 
7 51 0.163 
8 45.10 0.0912 
9 40.60 0.0473 
10 35.10 0.033 
3.2 Annual Dispatchable DG unit modeling 
Since dispatchable DG units are very similar to traditional generating systems connected to a 
transmission supply, they can assume an annual model based on DG units hardware availability ‎[54]. 
Through the historical data of a generating unit, it is possible to estimate a forced outage rate (FOR) 
that defines the probability to have the unit on forced outage at some distant time. Hence, the 
probability of being available for a dispatchable DG is simply the complement of its FOR, which is 
equivalent also to the ratio between the mean time to repair (MTTR), and the mean time between 
failures (MTBF), as follows ‎[41]: 
           
    
    
                                                    (3.1) 
TABLE V shows the annual model for a dispatchable DG characterized by two power output levels, 
both when FOR hardware is neglected and when it is considered. 
TABLE V: ANNUAL GENERATION MODEL FOR A CONVENTIONAL DG. 
Level Power output (kW)     
 
 (%)     
 
 (%) 
1 0 0 2 
2      100 98 
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3.3 Annual Renewable DG Unit Modeling 
Renewable DG units are much more difficult to model than dispatchable ones. This difficulty is 
due to the uncertainty of the DG units’ primary source (e.g., wind speed or solar irradiance), which 
leads to complication in finding a suitable annual model that well describes the behavior of the 
renewable DG. TABLE VI shows an annual generation model for wind-based DG ‎[53], where each 
power output level, described as a percentage of power rating is associated with both following 
probabilities: (    
 ), when FOR is considered, and (     
 ), when FOR is not taken into account. The 
used wind speed data is based mainly on average hourly values, so that wind speed variations within 
an hour are not considered. 
TABLE VI: ANNUAL GENERATION MODEL FOR A WIND DG ‎[53]. 
Level l Power output 
(%) 
     
      
  
1 100 0.073 0.0761 
2 94.96 0.024 0.0252 
3 84.97 0.032 0.0331 
4 74.97 0.044 0.0457 
5 64.97 0.046 0.04837 
6 54.98 0.075 0.0783 
7 44.98 0.089 0.0923 
8 34.98 0.109 0.1136 
9 19.99 0.101 0.105 
10 14.99 0.109 0.1137 
11 4.99 0.062 0.0648 










In this chapter a description of the adopted methodology for the evaluation of electrical system 
reliability indices of the adopted distribution test system will be given. The proposed methodology 
will be implemented during different operating scenarios and under different fault conditions. Further, 
adequacy assessment formulation is presented for different DG units categories during islanding 
mode of operation. Finally, the EENS evaluation procedure is described for different operation modes 
(with and without DG units), and based on first and second curtailment load, needed for successful 
islanding operation. 
The adopted methodology for distribution system reliability indices assessment is based on 
calculating the base parameters defined as the annual frequency of interruption and annual 
interruption duration at each Load Point LPi. The equations for these two parameters are given 
respectively by the following expressions ‎[55]: 
        
  
                      
  
                                                 (4.1) 
Then reliability indices are calculated as follows ‎[55]: 
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                           (4.3) 
For the calculation of the base parameters expressed in (4.1), the classical method can be used, as 
explained in ‎[36] - which is mainly a system dependent methodology, since it is described through 
general examples. Another method of base parameters assessment is to use the restoration of time-
based classification of LPs in a distribution system with DG units presented in ‎[56].  
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In this work, a set of wider system independent classification has been adopted, which is based on 
the relative positions of a considered LPi, a faulted branch or component, and a protection device of a 
generic distribution network ‎[40]. This methodology classifies five different cases for the calculation 
of LPs annual interruption frequency and duration, with or without both dispatchable and renewable 
DG units, as detailed in the following section. 
4.1 Electrical Reliability Parameters Assessment 
Radial distribution system consists of a set of series components, including lines, cables, 
disconnects (or isolators), bus-bars, etc. In a radial system, in order to ensure the service continuity of 
providing electrical energy to a consumer connected to any load point, is required that all components 
between that user and the supply point to be operating effectively. 
Basic reliability parameters can be described as follows, are given by: 
 i (num. failures/year) : average annual frequency of interruption for a certain load point 
(LPi) of the distribution system. This parameter considers the failure rates of all components 
(in failure state) that could cause an interruption of electrical energy supply for the considered 
load point. Moreover, i takes into account the probabilities of the different protection 
devices to isolate the failure away from the load point. 
 Ui (hours/year): average annual interruption or outage duration time in a certain load point 
(LPi) of the distribution system. This parameter expresses the average number of hours that 
LPi can experience in outage state during a year.  
To better explain how to perform the evaluation of distribution system reliability indices, first, 
basic reliability parameters are calculated utilizing traditional approach according to the system 
configuration. After that, same parameters calculation will be presented utilizing the a system 
independent systematic approach, adopted in this thesis.  
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4.1.1 Reliability Parameters without DG units (traditional approach) 
Based on the traditional approach ‎[36], for a simple radial network without any DG units, shown in 
Figure 5, calculation of the basic reliability parameters i, and Ui for load point number 2 (LP2) is 
presented by means of practical system configuration examples, as follows: 
 
FIGURE 5: SIMPLE RADIAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Calculation of the average frequency of interruption 2: Generally, failure rate of a certain load 
point LPi, is given by the summation of all failure rates f, of all network components that can affect 
its service continuity (causing an outage). In the following expressions are reported different cases for 
calculation of the frequency of interruption at LP2: 
 When elements 15 and 17 are protection devices not able to isolate possible faults in 
elements 5 and 7, annual frequency of interruption at LP2 is given by: 
      
  
                                                          (4.4) 
 When protection device elements 15 and 17 are circuit breakers (CBs), able to “instantly”  
isolate possible faults in elements 5 and 7, annual frequency of interruption at LP2 is given 
by: 
      
 
          
  




 When protection device elements 15 and 17 are circuit breakers (CBs), able to “instantly” 
isolate possible faults in elements  5 and 7 with a certain probability P15 and P16, 
respectively, annual frequency of interruption at LP2 is given by:     
      
 
                              
  
                             (4.6) 
                                                                                                                                   
Calculation of total interruption duration U2: In general, interruption duration rate of a certain load 
point could be obtained by the summation of failure rate f and repair time tr product of all components 
that could cause an outage in LP2. Therefore, expressions of total interruption duration U2 in load 
point 2 for different system configurations are resented as follows: 
 When protection device elements 15 and 17 are not able to isolate possible faults in 
elements 5 and 7, annual interruption duration of LP2 is given by:   
      
  
                                                            (4.7) 
where tri is the required repair time for the element i . 
 When protection device elements 15 and 17 are sectionalizers, annual interruption duration 
of LP2 is given by:  
      
 
                  
  
                                      (4.8) 
                     
Where tSc i is called switching time, and stands for the required time sectionalizer i to isolate the 
downstream faulted area. 
 
 When protection device elements 13 and 15 are sectionalizes, annual interruption duration 
of LP2 is given by: 
      
 
                  
  




It can be clearly noticed from the above presented practical examples of different possible 
distribution systems configurations, that classical electrical reliability evaluation technique is strongly 
system configuration dependent, and does not provide general expressions, for annual interruption 
frequency and duration, hence reliability indices assessment. Therefore, the following methodology is 
adopted in order to consider most of electrical distributions system configurations and to examine the 
effect of a fault in branch k on a load point LPi. For each LPi of the system, such an examination 
should be performed, taking into consideration the relative position of the LPi with the faulted branch 
k, and the involved protection device, either circuit breaker or sectionalizer, or both. Therefore, 
analytical expressions for annual interruption frequency and duration are presented for different cases 
related to different situations with different fault consequences on LPi depending on their relative 
position, as mentioned earlier.   
In the following subsection, a systematic approach for the evaluation of annual interruption 
frequency and duration in LPi is presented: once with no DG units are installed in the system, and 
again when DG units are installed in the system. Further, the possibility of operating in islanding 
mode of operation is assumed. 
The system presented in ‎[57] has been adopted to illustrate different methodology cases, which are 
presented in the following subsections. Modifications have been performed mainly in the layout 
configuration, in order to avoid system ring pattern, and to make the system have a radial scheme. 
4.1.2 Reliability Parameters without DG units (systematic approach) 
When it is supposed that no DG units are installed in the system, a failure in a branch could affect 
the interruption frequency and duration of a considered LPi in five different ways. The branch fault 
effect depends mainly on the fault position with respect to LPi, and on the type/installation point of 
the involved protection device. Therefore a classification of five classes is presented as follows: 
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 Case I (without DG units): 
When no protection device, either Circuit Breaker or Sectionalizer, is installed between the faulted 
branch k and LPi under study, the fault directly affects LPi, and customers connected to this load 
point will remain unsupplied for all the time required to repair the fault k, and the frequency of 
interruption of LPi will be equal to the failure rate of the faulted branch k, as expressed in the 
following set of equations: 
                                                                          
                                                                                                                                                (4.10) 
In Figure 6 a practical example of Case I occurrence in a distribution test system is shown, where 
the load point under study is LP20, and the faulted branch is supposed to be L19. 
  
 
FIGURE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF CASE I EVENT IN A DISTRIBUTION TEST SYSTEM ‎[57]. 
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 Case II (without DG units): 
When at least one circuit breaker is installed between a faulted branch k and load point LPi, and at 
the same time, that circuit breaker should not be placed between LPi and the upstream main supply 
substation. In this case the fault is not going to affect the service continuity of Lpi, since the involved 
circuit breaker can clear the fault and isolate the faulted area from LPi power flow. Therefore, the 
interruption frequency and duration in this case will be equal to zero as shown below:    
                                                                                    
                                                                                                                             (4.11) 
In Figure 7 an illustrative example for Case II is shown. In the adopted distribution test system, 
the considered load point for this case is LP20, and the faulted branch is supposed to be L33. 
 
 




 Case III (without DG units): 
The third case occurs when one or more circuit breakers are installed between the faulted branch k 
and the load point under study LPi. At the same time, these circuit breakers are installed between the 
main supply substation and LPi. Since no DG units are installed in the system, third case reliability 
parameters will be equal to the first case ones, so that the interruption frequency and duration at LPi, 
with a fault in branch k, will be dependent on branch k failure rate,   , and branch k repair time, 
respectively. Reliability base parameters, of the third case are given by the following expressions: 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                         (4.12) 
Figure 8 shows an applicable example for Case III on the adopted test system, where LPi is 
supposed to be LP20 , and the faulted branch is considered to be L1. 
         




 Case IV (without DG units): 
When there is at least one sectionalizer installed between LPi and the faulted branch k, and it is not 
placed between the main supply substation and LPi. At the same time, no circuit breakers are installed 
between LPi and the faulted branch k. Therefore, in case branch k is faulted, the upstream circuit 
breaker, with respect to the sectionalizer placed between LPi and branch k, will trip first, then the 
involved sectionalizer will clear the faulted area, so that finally the upstream circuit breaker could be 
closed again and restore the power supply to LPi. This means that LPi will remain unsupplied for the 
sectionalizing time     , and the interruption frequency of LPi will be equal to branch k failure rate. 
On the other hand, the interruption duration at LPi will be proportional to     , as expressed in the 
following equations.  
                                                                                              
                                                                                                                (4.13) 
Figure 9 shows an illustrative example for the aforementioned case IV on the adopted test system, 
where the considered load point is LP20, and L20 is supposed to be the faulted branch k.          
 
FIGURE 9: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF CASE VI EVENT IN A DISTRIBUTION TEST SYSTEM ‎[57]. 
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 Case V (without DG units): 
When at least one sectionalizer is installed between LPi and the faulted branch k, and is placed 
between the main supply substation and LPi. At the same time, no circuit breakers are installed 
between LPi and the faulted branch k. Therefore in the case that branch k is faulted, the upstream 
circuit breaker, with respect to the sectionalizer placed between LPi and branch k, will trip first; then 
that sectionalizer will clear the faulted area, and finally the upstream circuit breaker can be closed 
again. Since the sectionalizer is placed between LPi and the main substation supply, hence LPi will 
remain unsupplied for the fault repair time duration     , even after the fault has been cleared. 
Therefore LPi interruption frequency and duration will be proportional to branch k fault rate and 
repair time, respectively. Expressions for interruption frequency and duration, in this case, of LPi 
when branch k is faulted are reported as follows:  
                                                                                   
                                                                                                                            (4.14) 
Figure 10 shows a fault event in the adopted distribution test system according to case V, where 
the load point under study is considered to be L20, and the faulted branch is supposed to be L18. 
 
FIGURE 10: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF CASE V EVENT IN A DISTRIBUTION TEST SYSTEM ‎[57].  
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4.1.3 Reliability Parameters with DG units  (systematic approach) 
When micro-grids with DG units installed are allowed to operate in an islanding mode of 
operation, a faulted branch k could affect the interruption frequency and duration of a certain Load 
point LPi depending on the following: 
1) location of LPi; 
2) power demand of LPi; 
3) location of the faulted branch k; 
4) rating of the installed DG units; 
5) type of the DG units (dispatchable or renewable);  
6) DG units installation position in the distribution system. 
7) type of the involved protection devices (circuit breaker, sectionalizer, or both); 
8) involved protection devices installation position (circuit breaker, sectionalizer, or both); 
The first four points of the previous list determine the choice of the adequate case classification, as 
mentioned in the previous subsection. On the other hand, the last four points of the previous list 
determine the DG units’ adequacy probability,        , of a micro-grid, which is going to be used 
accordingly for reliability parameters evaluation in Case III and Case V, when DG units are installed. 
For Case I, Case II, and Case IV, expressions for annual interruption frequency,     , and duration, 
    , of LPi, when branch k is faulted, will remain invariant even after DG units installation in the 
micro-grid containing LPi. Therefore, Case III and Case V formulations are modified as follows when 





 Case III (with DG units): 
When a fault occurs in branch k (L1), the upstream circuit breaker will trip to clear the fault, and 
another circuit breaker A, upstream LPi (LP20), will trip to isolate the faulted area and create island j, 
which includes LPi and all the downstream load points. Therefore LPi can be supplied during 
islanding mode of operation of island j, according to the adequacy probability,        , of DG units 
installed in island j. Expressions for interruption frequency and duration of LPi in this case become:  
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                         (4.15) 
The previous set of formulations are valid only in the case that no sectionalizers are installed 
between faulted branch k and circuit breaker A. Otherwise, when one or more sectionalizers are 
installed in that position, Sub- Case III.I and Sub-Case III.II are presented as follows:    
                    
 
 Sub-Case III.I (with DG units):  
In addition to the description given above for Case III, this sub-case applies when one or more 
sectionalizers are installed between the faulted branch k and circuit breaker A (upstream LPi), and at 
the same time between the circuit breaker A and the main supply substation. When a fault occurs in 
branch k, the following procedure list shows the sequence of fault clearance and islanding operation. 
1) circuit breaker A, installed upstream LPi, trips first forming island j. Therefore DG units, 
installed in island j, can supply LPi in an islanding mode of operation according to their 
adequacy probability, as explained previously in Case III with DG units.  
2) then sectionalizer sc, closest to the fault, will be opened;  
3) after that, DG units, installed between the opened sectionalizer sc and circuit breaker A, 
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will be connected, or reconnected in case they were operating during grid connected mode 
of operation before the fault occurrence;  
4) afterwards, circuit breaker A will be closed directly; 
5) thus, sectionalizer sc will be forming a bigger island sc after time equal to                
since the fault occurred.  
Since sectionalizer sc is upstream from circuit breaker A, obviously, island sc includes load points 
and DG units situated between sectionalizer sc and circuit breaker A along with island j created 
previously by circuit breaker A tripping. Therefore, before circuit breaker A is closed, LPi was 
belonging to island j, then after the circuit breaker A closure, LPi belongs to island sc. 
As a result, before circuit breaker A closure, LPi is affected by a fault in branch k according to the 
adequacy probability of island j DG units          , and after the closure of A, LPi is affected by 
branch k fault according to the adequacy probability of island sc DG units      . Expressions for 
interruption frequency and duration of LPi, for Sub-CaseIII.I, are given by the following equations: 
                                                                 
                                                                                            (4.16) 
A practical example on the adopted distribution test system for Sub-CaseIII.I is shown in Figure 
11, where the load point under study is LP8 , and the faulted branch is supposed to be L19. Further, 
circuit breaker A is the one right upstream from load point LP8, and sectionalzer sc is right 





FIGURE 11: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF SUB-CASE III-I EVENT IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ‎[57]. 
 Sub-Case III.II (with DG units):  
In addition to the description given for Case III, this sub-case applies when at least one 
sectionalizer is placed between the faulted branch k and circuit breaker A (installed right upstream 
LPi). At the same time, this sectionalizer should not be placed between the circuit breaker A and the 
main supply substation. 
The sequence of fault clearance and islanding operation is listed as follows: 
1) first, circuit breaker A trips, consequently will be forming island j; 
2) therefore, DG units installed in island j will supply LPi based on their adequacy 
probability, as mentioned in the description of Case III.  
3) then sectionalizer sc, closest to the faulted branch k, will be tripped, allowing LPi to be 
supplied from the main supply substation. 




                                                                              
                                                                                                                                 (4.17)   
An applicable example on the adopted distribution test system is shown in Figure 12, where the 
load point under study is considered to be L23, and the faulted branch is supposed to be L24; circuit 
breaker A is right upstream from L23, and sectionalizer sc is right upstream from L23. 
 
FIGURE 12: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF SUB-CASE III-II EVENT IN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ‎[57]. 
 Case V (with DG units): 
In addition to the description given previously for Case V, when DG units are installed in the 
micro-grid that contains LPi, the sequence of fault clearance and islanding operation is listed as 
follows: 
4) The circuit breaker upstream from the faulted branch k will sense the fault and trip first; 
5) sectionalizer sc, placed between the faulted branch k and LPi will be opened after the 




6) then DG units, installed in island sc, will be connected or reconnected again in case they 
were not operating before the fault occurrence during grid connected mode of operation. 
Therefore, the time required for DG units to be available is       ; 
7) at that stage, LPi can be supplied, during islanding mode of operation, by DG units 
installed in the island sc, based on their adequacy probability    , after time given by 
             ; 
8) finally, LPi can be supplied again by the main power supply after the failure in branch k 
has been repaired by     . 
When the islanding mode of operation is allowed and in the presence of DG units, analytical 
expressions for interruption frequency and duration of LPi, in Case V, are modified with respect to 
the case where no DG units were present as follows: 
                                                                    
                                                                                                                    (4.18) 
4.2 Assessment of Micro-Grids Adequacy during Islanding Mode of Operation 
According to ‎[58], during islanding mode of operation, dispatchable DG units’ penetration level in 
a micro-grid should be equal at least to 60% of micro-grid total peak load demand at time of 
islanding, otherwise islanding would not be allowed. The main reason behind this condition is both 
the ensuring of required reactive power, and operational security constraints (voltage and frequency 
control during islanding mode of operation). 
In order to allow islanding even if the previous condition is not verified, part of the total micro-
grid load could be curtailed until the above condition is verified. Thus a first curtailment level is 
defined, and since islanding might occur at any load level, and not necessarily at peak load, the first 
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load curtailment is defined with reference to the actual micro-grid load at time of islanding      
   by 
the following expression: 
           
      
  
     
 
   
                                                            (4.19) 
Therefore, a remaining power load demand in island j (    
     , after first curtailment, will 
represent a new load demand to be considered for the assessment of island j adequacy probability. 
Such new power load demand is given by the following expression: 
    
         
             
                                                          (4.20) 
The adequacy assessment of DG units that belong to a certain island expresses how much those 
DG units are able to supply the micro-grid load during eventual islanding mode of operation. An 
analytical formulation is now presented to assess DG units adequacy in each portion of the network 
that could operate in islanding mode. The adequacy probability of DG units installed in a potential 
island is calculated based on the following parameters related to the micro-grid or island under study: 
 loads probabilistic  modeling; 
 dispatchable DG units probabilistic modeling; 
 renewable DG units probabilistic modeling; 
 rating of each DG unit in the island; 
 micro-grid’s load demand at time of islanding.  
A similar formulation has been previously presented in ‎[40] without considering both load 
correlation and first load curtailment that island j might require in order to respect technical 
constraints. The formulation is based on the combination of all possible operating conditions of LPs 
and DG units with their probabilities. In this work, correlation between loads has been taken into 
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consideration, which means that for an island j, only one annual load model for all micro-grid LPs 
total load is considered. 
First, the adequacy probability of DG units installed in island j, formed after the upstream 
protection device A has tripped, has been evaluated using the island j new load demand. Thus, the 
adequacy probability formulation would be computed as follows: 
       
       
          
  
   
    
  
                                                       (4.21) 
where               
   
   
 is the number of working points at which island j can operate, i.e., the 
number of combinations considering the annual load model and DG units with their       and     , 
respectively; 
   
          
             
               
     is island j load demand at the m-th combination, which 
corresponds to any of island j load levels because of the load correlation;    
      
      
      
      
  is the total generated power out of any category of DG units available in island j at the m-th 
combination (e.g.     
      
         
  );         
       
      
          
 
 
is the probability 
related to the m-th combination for island j (e.g.         
       
      
          
 ). It is worth 
noting that 
      
  
                           (4.22) 
Considering working point m, if the total available power output is: 
1. Equal or greater than the total power demand, then the local DG units can supply all local LPs. 
Hence,        
        
      
    ; 
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2. Lower than the total power demand, and then the local DG units can supply some LPs only. 
Hence,         
        
      
 . In this case, some customers are left unsupplied and their load 
demand would be curtailed further, so that DG units cannot fully supply their island load demand 
(after the first load curtailment) at islanding time occurrence. Therefore, a second level of load 
curtailment is defined as 
          
     
        
                                                   (4.23) 
When, for all combination of working points, the total available power output is equal or greater 
than the total power demand, the ρoA is equal to one (      ). On the other hand, if there are not DG 
units in the island, the ρoA is equal to zero (      ). In this case, CB j does not trip because no fault 
current flows through it, so that no island is formed.  
In this way, the resulting adequacy probability, expressed in (4.15), is not expressing the real state 
of island j, since the considered load is not the actual power demand (    
    ) of island j. Therefore, a 
new adequacy probability is defined to take care of the first curtailed load as expressed in the 
following equation: 
                
           
 
    
                                               (4.24) 
When, for all combination of working points, the total available power output is equal or greater 
than the total power demand, the ρoA is equal to one (      ). On the other hand, if there are not DG 
units in the island, the ρoA is equal to zero (      ). In this case, CB j does not trip because no fault 
current flows through it, so that no island is formed.  
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4.3 Expected Energy Not Served Evaluation 
Before going through the details of the Expected Energy Not Served (EENS) evaluation, a 
definition of two cases, based on the service interruption source, is presented as follows: 
1
st
 case: when interruption is caused by a fault which occurred within island j under study; 
2
nd
 case: when service interruption is caused by a fault which occurred upstream from island j 
under study. 
The annual interruption duration for an island is a function of the number of failures that might 
trigger a service interruption, and the required time to repair such faults in order to restore customers’ 
service. Interruption duration expressions for the 1st and 2nd case are described respectively as 
follows: 
 
                                                
                                                
                                    (4.25) 
Repair time tr is the same for all components, and is equal to 5 hours ‎[59]. 
Since the test system under study is radial, elements of any segment or island are connected in 
series; therefore faults for the 1st and 2nd case are expressed respectively as follows: 
 
                 
  
   
                 
  
   
                                                       (4.26) 
EENS due to a fault within an island j under study or upstream are given respectively by 
             
        
     
   
         
         
     
   
         
                  (4.27) 
             
        
     
   
         
         
     
   
         
                  (4.28) 
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The result of multiplying the ith correlation probability       or       times 8760 h gives the fraction 
of the total interruption duration, for first or second case fault, that occurs at the load level l. 
The evaluation of total EENS and interruption duration with and without DG units for island j are 
presented below. 
4.3.1 EENS Evaluation without DG Units 
EENS and U for island j when no DG units are installed in it are given by the total EENS and U, 
for island j, caused by the 1st and 2nd case interruption source as reported below 
 
                                      
                          
                                              (4.29) 
4.3.2 EENS Evaluation with DG Units 
Since EENS for island j depends on the interruption origin, then 
 When faults occur within island j (first case), EENS and interruption duration are given by 
 
                          
                
                                                             (4.30) 
 When faults occur within island j (second case), EENS and interruption duration are given by 
 
                                                                                                
                
  
     
   
           
        
  
              
       










Case study and results 
In this chapter, some assumptions and technical considerations which have been considered for the 
evaluation of electrical system reliability indices and EENS will be presented. Also, a description for 
the adopted electrical distribution test system will be provided. 
Afterwards, electrical reliability evaluation results will be presented and discussed for the different 
proposed scenarios of operation, including different DG units penetration levels. Moreover, EENS 
evaluation results will also be presented. 
5.1 Assumptions and Considerations 
The technical and practical assumptions and considerations which have been taken into account 
during the evaluation of both operation reliability indices and annual EENS are listed as follows: 
 Islanding mode of operation has been assumed to be allowed for micro-grids; 
 N-1 contingency has been assumed which means that a fault is repaired before a 
subsequent one occurs ‎[42]; 
 Failure rates of protection devices, such as circuit breakers (CBs) and sectionalizers, have 
been taken into consideration for the evaluation of both reliability indices and EENS; 
unlike the assumption made in ‎[60] and ‎[61], where protection devices are considered fully 
reliable; 
 No fuses are installed in the system, which is a practical assumption for a medium voltage 
system with 27.6 kV and higher; 
 The distribution network is radially operated; 
 Presence of advanced techniques, able to perform proper load curtailment when required. 
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5.2 Test System Description 
Based on ‎[62], a 69-bus is considered as a test system for this work. This system consists of eight 
lateral distribution feeders with a few modifications in the connection scheme in order to ensure a 
radial system configuration for the distribution network. Total nominal feeder load is 3.8 MW. 
In order to simplify the reliability assessment procedure, a segmentation concept will be adopted, 
which means that LPs will not be treated separately, rather the system will be modeled as a set of 
segments. Each segment is defined as a set of LPs or components whose entry component is a switch 
or a protective device. In this way, any faulted part of a segment will have the same effect on the rest 
of the system, and similarly all LPs of a segment will be affected equally by any fault occurring in the 
rest of the system ‎[4]. 
The adopted distribution test system layout, before segmentation has been performed and without 
the placement of any recloser, is shown in Figure 13. 
The system layout, after segmentation has been performed, is shown in Figure 14, where six 
segments have been identified according to the installed reclosers positions, as explained earlier. 
After segmentation has been performed, peak power demand for each segment,           
  is 
identified and presented in Table VII, along with the load points that each segment contains.  
When a recloser      installed at load point LPi trips, all of the downstream segments would be 
forming potentially an island j. Accordingly, reclosers that can form possible islands are reported 
inTable VIII along with segments characterizing each island. 
To be assumed firstly, two DG units are installed in each segment at buses 26, 34, 38, 41, 54 and 
90. Such DG units are one conventional (diesel) of rating 200 kVA, and another renewable (wind-
based) of rating 200 kVA. 
The calculation procedure for reliability indices is as follows: 
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First, all system branches’ failure rates are calculated based on their length and the average failure 
rate per unit length, taken from ‎[59], as follows: 
                                                                     (5.1) 
where the factor 1.61 is for conversion from one mile to one kilometre, and the repair time per one 
failure is equal for all branches, and is given by 5 hours as reported in ‎[59].  
 




FIGURE 14: DISTRIBUTION TEST SYSTEM SEGMENTS DEFINED BY DASHED LINES ‎[62]. 
TABLE VII: SEGMENTS LOAD POINTS AND POWER DEMAND. 











1 31 4 68 50 11 
2 32 5 69 51 12 
3 33 6 70 52 13 
27 34 7 88 53 14 
28  8 89 54 15 
29  9 90  16 
30  10   17 
27e  40   18 
28e  41   19 
65  42   20 
66  43   21 
67  44   22 
35  45   23 
36  46   24 
37  47   25 
38  48   26 
  49   57 
  55   58 
  56    
N˚ of LPs/Segment 16 4 19 6 5 18 
        
 (kVA) 1962.118 42.924 605.611 92.423 797.041 603.546 
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TABLE VIII: SEGMENTS INCLUDED IN EACH ISLAND. 
Island j      Segments Included in Island j 
Island 1 R1,0 Segment 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6 
Island 2 R2,31 Segment 2 
Island 3 R3,4 Segment 3; 5; 6 
Island 4 R4,68 Segment 4 
Island 5 R5,50 Segment 5 
Island 6 R6,11 Segment 6 
5.3 Electrical Reliability Evaluation Results 
After considering the technical constraints for a successful operation of micro-grids in islanding 
mode, reliability evaluation is performed. In order to evaluate the effect of the presence of DG units 
on the system behavior, and hence on the system reliability, two scenarios have been proposed and 
are described as follows: 
1
st
 scenario: In this scenario, the total penetration level of DG units in each segment has been 
maintained constant, however the penetration percentage for each DG category (dispatchable and 
non-dispatchable) has been changed through three case studies, as shown in Table IX. 
Table X reports the ratings for DG units, dispatchable and non-dispatchable ones, installed in each 
island for each case study. In Table XI to Table XIII, the three cases results of this first scenario are 
shown. For each case, and for each island, the 1st load curtailment (at peak load), the max 2nd load 
curtailment, and adequacy probability at different operational conditions are reported. 
TABLE IX: 1ST SCENARIO DG UNITS PENETRATION PERCENTAGE 
1st scenario DG unit type 




Case 1 75% 25% 
Case 2 50% 50% 




TABLE X: 1ST SCENARIO DG UNITS PENETRATION LEVELS FOR EACH ISLAND 
 1st scenario 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Island 1 
 
Diesel (kW) 1800 1200 600 
Wind (kW) 600 1200 1800 
Island 2 Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 100 200 300 
Island 3 Diesel (kW) 900 600 300 
Wind (kW) 300 600 900 
Island 4 Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 100 200 300 
Island 5 Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 100 200 300 
Island 6 Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 100 200 300 
TABLE XI: 1ST SCENARIO--CASE 1 
Island j       
  
(kVA) 
             
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
            
(%) 
        
(%) 
Island 1 4103.67 1103.7 3000 94.47 69.06 93.14 
Island 2 42.9242 0 42.92 99.46 99.46 99.46 
Island 3 2191.05 691.048 1500 94.09 64.41 91.58 
Island 4 92.4238 0 92.42 99.25 99.25 99.25 
Island 5 797.042 297.041 500 93.78 58.83 89.11 
Island 6 603.547 103.546 500 95.91 79.46 95.62 
TABLE XII: 1ST SCENARIO--CASE 2 
Island j        
  
(kVA) 
              
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
             
(%) 
         
(%) 
Island  1 4103.67 2103.67 2000 96.07 46.82 82.64 
Island 2 42.9242 0 42.9242 99.55 99.55 99.55 
Island 3 2191.05 1191.05 1191.05 96.06 43.84 80.17 
Island 4 92.4238 0 92.4238 99.45 99.45 99.45 
Island 5 797.042 463.71 333.333 96.06 40.17 76.84 





TABLE XIII: 1ST SCENARIO--CASE 3 
Island j        
  
(kVA) 
              
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
             
(%) 
         
(%) 
Island  1 4103.67 3103.7 1000 97.39 23.73 61.19 
Island 2 42.9242 0 42.9242 99.58 99.58 99.58 
Island 3 2191.05 1691 500 97.39 22.22 59.68 
Island 4 92.4238 0 92.4238 99.52 99.52 99.52 
Island 5 797.042 630.375 166.667 97.39 20.36 57.82 
Island 6 603.547 436.88 166.667 97.39 26.89 64.35 
2nd scenario: In this scenario, the penetration percentage for each DG category (dispatchable and 
non-dispatchable) has been maintained constant, however the total penetration level of DG units in 
each segment has been changed through three case studies, as shown in TABLE XIV. TABLE XV 
tabulates the ratings for the DG units installed in each island, dispatchable and non-dispatchable, for 
each case study. The results of the three cases of this second scenario are shown in TABLE XVI to 
TABLE VIII, presenting the same parameters mentioned in the 1st scenario. 
TABLE XIV: 2ND SCENARIO DG UNITS PENETRATION PERCENTAGE 
2nd scenario DG unit type 
Dispatchable  per 
segment (Diesel) (kW) 
Non-Dispatchable (Wind-
based) per segment (kW) 
Case 1 300 300 
Case 2 200 200 





TABLE XV: 2ND SCENARIO DG UNITS PENETRATION LEVELS FOR EACH ISLAND 
 2nd scenario 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Island 1 Diesel (kW) 1800 1200 600 
Wind (kW) 1800 1200 600 
Island 2 
 
Diesel (kW)  300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 300 200 100 
Island 3 
 
Diesel (kW) 900 600 300 
Wind (kW) 900 600 300 
Island 4 
 
Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 300 200 100 
Island 5 
 
Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 300 200 100 
Island 6 
 
Diesel (kW) 300 200 100 
Wind (kW) 300 200 100 
TABLE XVI: 2ND SCENARIO--CASE 1 
Island j        
  
(kVA) 
              
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
             
(%) 
         
(%) 
Island 1 4103.67 1103.7 3000 96.59 70.61 95.24 
Island 2 42.9242 0 42.9242 99.58 99.58 99.58 
Island 3 2191.05 691.04 1500 96.34 65.95 93.76 
Island 4 92.4238 0 92.4238 99.52 99.52 99.52 
Island 5 797.042 297.042 500 96.11 60.29 91.33 
Island 6 603.547 103.547 500 97.45 80.73 97.14 
TABLE XVII: 2ND SCENARIO--CASE 2 
Island j        
  
(kVA) 
              
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
             
(%) 
         
(%) 
Island 1 4103.67 2103.67 2000 96.07 46.82 82.64 
Island 2 42.9242 0 42.9242 99.55 99.55 99.55 
Island 3 2191.05 1191.05 1191.05 96.06 43.84 80.17 
Island 4 92.4238 0 92.4238 99.45 99.45 99.45 
Island 5 797.042 463.709 333.333 96.06 40.17 76.84 






TABLE XVIII: 2ND SCENARIO--CASE 3 
Island j        
  
(kVA) 
              
  
(kVA) 
            
  
(kVA) 
     
(%) 
             
(%) 
         
(%) 
Island 1 4103.67 3103.7 1000 96.05 23.41 60.35 
 Island 2 42.9242 0 42.9242 99.47 99.47 99.47 
 Island 3 2191.05 1691 500 96.05 21.92 58.86 
 Island 4 92.4238 0 92.4238 99.25 99.25 99.25 
 Island 5 797.042 630.375 166.667 96.05 20.08 57.02 
 Island 6 603.547 436.88 166.667 96.05 26.52 63.46 
Since an islanding mode of operation might occur at any load demand level (out of the ten states 
that define the annual load model as explained previously in section 3.1),            
 , 
          
 ,             
 ,     , and         have all been computed for each load level that island j 
might be exposed to. 
On the other hand,              
  and              have been evaluated considering that islanding 
occurs at the peak level demand of island j under study. Such assumption represents the worst case 
load scenario that islanding might occur at. 
Afterwards, based on LPs relative position with respect to both protection devices and faulted 
branches, annual interruption frequency      and duration      for all LPs are calculated according to 
the appropriate case formulation of the adopted methodology.  
Finally, Reliability indices (i.e., SAIFI and SAIDI) of the system are calculated using equations 1 
and 2. The indices have been computed once during grid connection mode, when no DG units are 
installed anywhere, and another time for each of the three case studies of the two proposed scenarios 
during islanding mode and after installing DG units. 
Table XIX shows the final results of the test system reliability indices in different case scenarios 
as described earlier, for both worst case load (islanding occurs at peak load) and real case (islanding 
might occur at any annual load model) conditions. In FIGURE 15 and FIGURE 16, results of reliability 
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indices (SAIFI and SAIDI) for the different scenarios and cases are presented in comparison. 
TABLE XIX: RELIABILITY INDICES FINAL RESULTS 
Scenarios Reliability Indices 
Using             
(worst load condition) 
Using         











Interruption duration per 
customer( hours)/year 


















  Case1 1.50 7.52 1.09 5.49 
Case 2 1.80 9.01 1.27 6.34 










  Case 1 1.48 7.42 1.07 5.33 
Case 2 1.80 9.01 1.27 6.34 
Case 3 2.12 10.58 1.57 7.86 
 
































FIGURE 16 RESULTS FOR SAIDI UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Since the islanding mode of operation is not allowed for the base case (without DG units), 
therefore reliability indices (SAIFI and SAIDI) will remain invariant for both worst and real load 
conditions. Further, it can be noticed from the above results that when no DG units are installed in the 
system, reliability indices are inherently high with respect to the other cases. Hence, the presence of 
DG units when islanding mode of operation is allowed, has significantly improved the overall system 
reliability level. 
Allowing a 1st load curtailment, whenever needed, improves the overall reliability level by 
allowing different micro-grids a successful operation in islanding mode, regardless of the micro-grid 
loading condition and dispatchable DG units rating at islanding occurrence. 
5.4 Expected Energy not Served Evaluation Results 
As for DG units penetration level used for the evaluation of EENS, case 2 of the 1st scenario 
discussed in section 5.3 is adopted. Applying the aforementioned proposed methodology, EENS 
evaluation is performed. Based on the adopted test system, components that are responsible for an 
































branches belonging to different segments, or main supply substation. In Table XX, the system 
components that might imply island j service interruption for both 1st and 2nd case are reported. 
TABLE XX: SYSTEM COMPONENTS INVOLVED IN A SERVICE INTERRUPTION 
 Possible Service Interruption Source 
 
Segment Seg Recloser       Substation 
Island 1 1
st
 case Seg 1; 2; 3; 4; 
5; 6 
R1,0 ;  R2,31;  R3,4;  









 case Seg 2 R2,31 - 
2
nd 





 case Seg 3; 5; 6 R4,68; R5,50;  R6,11 - 
2
nd 





 case Seg 4 R4,68 - 
2
nd 





 case Seg 5 R5,50 - 
2
nd 





 case Seg 6 R6,11 - 
2
nd 
case Seg 1; 3 R1,0,; R3,4 Substation 
 
Table XXII reports the results of EENS evaluation along with some related calculation parameters. 
The assessment is performed for both grid-connected (without DG units) and islanding (with DG 




















island j  
(1st case) 
Fault upstream island j  
(2nd case) 
     
h 
         
MWh 
     
h 
           
  
kVA 
          
  
kVA 
         
MWh 
1 4103.67 47.9 120.994 0.5 573.4 57.6 1.263 
2 42.9242 8.83 0.23327 2.98 0 0.08 0.079 
3 2191.05 33.9 45.8459 2.98 362.3 28.9 4.014 
4 92.4238 2.60 0.14802 2.98 0 0.22 0.169 
5 797.042 5.07 2.48899 16.2 159.4 9.64 7.948 
6 603.547 15.7 5.83113 16.2 56.02 9.53 6.018 
 
TABLE XXII: TOTAL EENS FINAL RESULTS FOR EACH ISLAND  
Island j          
(h) 
       
(h) 
           
(kWh) 
         
(kWh) 
         
(kWh) 
Island 1 48.41 47.91 122256.36 120993.62 315.485 
Island 2 11.81 8.830 311.8982 233.26957 0.23687 
Island 3 36.98 33.99 49859.49 45845.919 1164.45 
Island 4 5.579 2.602 317.3206 148.01812 0.64715 
Island 5 21.28 5.074 10436.92 2488.986 2739.15 
Island 6 31.90 15.69 11849.57 5831.1278 1062.15 
From the previous results it can be noticed that islands 2, 3, and 4 share the same upstream 
components; hence their interruption duration due to an upstream fault      is the same. Further, for a 
fault occurring within island j, both EENSj,1 and Uj,1 will not be reduced with the installation of DG 
units in the considered island j. On the other hand, when service interruption is caused by a fault 
upstream island j, the interruption duration      will not change after DG units have been installed in 
island j. However, the unserved power load demand in island j would be reduced, therefore the 
        would be reduced to         , which is given by the summation of 1
st and 2nd load 
curtailment during the year (each with the corresponding probability) multiplied by the annual 





In this work, a systematic approach with a set of system independent analytical expressions has 
been adopted in order to perform reliability evaluation for distribution systems. The evaluation 
considered annual probabilistic models for micro-grid components during islanding mode of 
operation. Therefore, the variable load profile has been considered, expressed through an annual load 
model that associates a certain probability of occurrence during a year at each adopted load demand 
level. 
Further, the stochastic nature of the primary source of the renewable DG units has been taken into 
account by adopting an annual output model for a wind-based DG unit. Moreover, the failure 
probabilities of DG units hardware, for both dispatchable and renewable DG units, have been taken 
into account for the development of their annual probabilistic output power model. 
Also, the success condition for islanding has been improved by introducing an additional level of 
load curtailment, in order to allow islanding when the stability condition is not fulfilled. Hence, a new 
adequacy probability has been introduced in order to take into account such additional load 
curtailment, and the correlation between different loads within the island under study. Based on the 
improved islanding success condition, reliability indices have been evaluated for the system (SAIFI 
and SAIDI) with reasonable penetration levels and ratios of DG units.  
EENS assessment has been performed, adopting a new modified formulation when DG units are 
installed, and the island j under study is operating in islanding mode. Such formulation is based on 
the total annual 1st and 2nd possible curtailed loads, along with their respective probabilities. 
Load correlation and failure rate of protection devices has been taken into consideration in this 
work, for both reliability indices evaluation and EENS assessment. 
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Therefore, the contribution of the first load curtailment introduction is to guarantee the necessary 
security level for micro-grid islanding operation in presence of hybrid DG units, regardless of the 
island load demand condition and generation capacity of the installed DG units at time of islanding. 
Consequently, this implies significantly in the improvement of the overall system reliability level 
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Appendix A: Distribution Test System Data 



















 1 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 48 100 43.2 108.932 
3 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 
27 26 11.16 28.293 55 18 7.8 19.617 
28 26 11.16 28.293 56 18 7.8 19.617 
29 0 0 0 68 1.2 0.6 1.341 
30 414.67 177.6 451.101 69 0 0 0 
27e 26 11.13 28.282 70 6 2.58 6.531 
28e 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 89 39.22 15.78 42.275 
66 24 10.2 26.077 90 39.22 15.78 42.275 
67 24 10.2 26.077 50 414.67 177.6 451.101 
35 414.67 177.6 451.101 51 32 13.8 34.848 
36 79 33.84 85.942 52 0 0 0 
37 384.7 164.7 418.473 53 227 97.2 246.934 
38 384.7 164.7 418.473 54 59 25.2 64.156 
31 0 0 0 11 145 62.4 157.856 
32 14 6 15.231 12 8 3.3 8.653 
33 19.5 8.4 21.232 13 8 3.3 8.6539 
34 6 2.4 6.462 14 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 15 45.5 18 48.931 
5 2.6 1.32 2.915 16 60 21 63.568 
6 40.4 18 44.228 17 60 21 63.568 
7 75 32.4 81.699 18 0 0 0 
8 30 13.2 32.775 19 1 0.36 1.062 
9 28 11.4 30.231 20 114 48.6 123.927 
10 145 62.4 157.856 21 5.3 2.1 5.7008 
40 40.5 16.98 43.915 22 0 0 0 
41 3.6 1.62 3.947 23 28 12 30.463 
42 4.53 2.1 4.993 24 0 0 0 
43 26.4 11.4 28.756 25 14 6 15.231 
44 24 10.32 26.124 26 14 6 15.231 
45 0 0 0 57 28 12 30.463 
46 0 0 0 58 28 12 30.463 
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TABLE XXIV FAILURE RATE AND REPAIR TIME OF THE BRANCHES 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
 
Segment 6 
Branch k    (f/yr) Branch k    (f/yr) Branch k    (f/yr) Branch k    (f/yr) 
1 0.00064 31 0.14097 4 0.01029 11 0.28581 
2 0.00064 32 0.33667 5 0.14677 12 0.41392 
3 0.00064 33 0.68622 6 0.1532 13 0.41907 
27 0.00193 34 0.59223         7 0.0373 14 0.42486 
28 0.02574 
Segment 4 
8 0.01995 15 0.07917 
29 0.15964 9 0.32894 16 0.15063 
30 0.02832 68 0.29225 10 0.07531 17 0.00193 
27e 0.00193 69 0.12424 40 0.03733 18 0.13132 
28e 0.02574 70 0.01673 41 0.13325 19 0.08432 
65 0.04248 88 0.03283 42 0.07016 20 0.13711 
66 0.01223 89 0.04377 43 0.08175 21 0.00579 
67 0.00064 90 0.00064 44 0.11394 22 0.06373 
35 0.00128 
Segment 5 
45 0.11329 23 0.13904 
36 0.03411 46 0.63858 24 0.30062 
37 0.11651 50 0.20406 47 0.31478 25 0.12424 
38 0.03283 51 0.03926 48 0.12231 26 0.06952 
  52 0.05793 49 0.15514  57 0.29676 
  53 0.28517 55 0.08111 58 0.00193 
  54 0.41842 56 0.00193   
 
